Chester v afshar 2004. Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 927 2022-10-22
Chester v afshar 2004
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The case of Chester v Afshar, also known as Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, was a legal case decided by the House of Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom, in 2004. The case concerned the liability of a doctor for the consequences of a patient's decision to decline a recommended medical treatment.
The case involved Mr. John Chester, who suffered from chronic back pain. His doctor, Dr. Afshar, recommended that he undergo a lumbar laminectomy, a surgical procedure to relieve pressure on the spinal cord. Mr. Chester declined the surgery, opting instead for alternative treatments such as physiotherapy and acupuncture. Mr. Chester's condition worsened, and he eventually became paralyzed from the waist down. He sued Dr. Afshar for negligence, alleging that the doctor had not adequately warned him of the potential risks of declining the surgery.
The House of Lords held that Dr. Afshar was not liable for Mr. Chester's injuries. The court found that Mr. Chester had made an informed decision to decline the surgery, and that the doctor had fulfilled his duty of care by providing adequate information about the risks and benefits of the surgery. The court held that the doctor could not be held responsible for the consequences of Mr. Chester's decision to decline the recommended treatment.
The case of Chester v Afshar has had significant implications for the legal responsibilities of doctors and the rights of patients to make decisions about their own medical treatment. The decision of the House of Lords established that doctors have a duty to provide patients with information about the risks and benefits of medical treatments, but that they are not liable for the consequences of a patient's decision to decline recommended treatment. This ruling has helped to clarify the legal duties of doctors and the rights of patients in the United Kingdom and has been widely cited in other legal cases involving medical negligence.
Chester v Afshar (1).rtf
This links to one of the compensatory aims of tort which is to put claimants in the position they would have been in but for the negligence. However, she claimed that she would have sought a second opinion had she had more time to do so. Specific legal advice about your particular circumstances should always be sought. The operation involved three stages with the purpose of the third stage being relocation of the nerve with a view to preventing the neuroma recurring. At first appeal, the Court of Appeal approved the initial decision.
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Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 587
Normally, the plank would case minimum damge, but sometimes and what happened in this case a set of events that happened were far greater than scratches. However, if he had taken the opposite view, Ms Chester would not have been successful in her claim on the basis of an application of ideal desire autonomy. Hold the claimant liable for all direct consequences for their breach of duty 2. Recognizing an individual right of autonomy makes self-creation possible. We allow someone to choose death over radical amputation or a blood transfusion, if that is his informed wish, because we acknowledge his right to a life structured by his own values.
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Chester v Afshar
Thus, it seems that the Chester exception applies where the claimant may not have refused treatment altogether but would have, at least, delayed it. The doctor now appealed. Cited — Professional to use Skilled Persons Ordinary Care Negligence was alleged against a doctor. But it is also intended to enable the patient to make an informed choice whether to undergo the treatment recommended and, if so, at whose hands and when. In law, on the other hand, problems of causation arise in the context of ascertaining or apportioning legal responsibility for a given occurrence. The credibility of that evidence will then be assessed by reference to what a reasonable patient would have done. For my part I found the dissenting judgment of McHugh J particularly powerful, and rightly counsel for the surgeon relied heavily on it.
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Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 927
At first instance, the judge determined that even though the doctor was not negligent in his surgical performance, he was liable for having failed to inform the claimant of the risks. I would find that result unacceptable. From this perspective, her decision to proceed with a suture repair is not irrational, simply a different weighting of values. Or is this a case where courts are entitled to see to it that justice is done despite the absence of causal connection? I think it is the latter and for the following reason. SCOPE AND LIMITS OF CHESTER Correia and Diamond suggest that Chester is confined to cases where, had the claimant been given the required information, they would not have undergone the treatment when they did, albeit that they may have undergone the treatment at a later date.
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Nov 21:22 Causation 3
Not surprisingly, the authors approach the matter from slightly different angles. Sometimes it is done by saying that there is a break in the chain of causation. The injury was intimately involved with the duty to warn. She has shown that but for the failure to warn she would not have consented to surgery on Monday 21 November 1994. D breached his tortious duty to P to warn her of the possible complication of an operation and this complication occurred. He saw Chappel v Hart as an illustration of one of the types of case that he had in mind, where a plaintiff is entitled to recover from a defendant who has without negligence caused the sort of injury the risk of which the defendant should have warned the plaintiff. The claim in respect of informed consent, however, failed.
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Correia, Diamond and the Chester Exception: Vindicating Patient Autonomy?
The surgery was performed 3 days later. To make good her case and obtain damages, Mrs Hart was not required to negative the proposition that any later treatment would have been attended with the same or a greater degree of risk: para 76. The judge held that if she had the operation on another occasion it may have been successful. Subsequent judgments in the Court of Appeal expressed concerns over the lack of clarity of the legal principles to be derived from that judgment. A claimant is entitled to be compensated for the damage which the negligence of another has caused to him or her.
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A Critique of Chester v Afshar on JSTOR
Coggon is not critical of the use of different understandings of autonomy within medical law as long as the court is explicit about which concept of autonomy is being used, although he expresses a preference for best desire autonomy. Held: The appeal failed. The claimant sought damages for the reduction in his prospects of disease-free survival for. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Professor Rob Heywood Professor of Medical Law, School of law, University of East Anglia for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. Unless this is done the duty is a hollow one, stripped of all practical force and devoid of all content. Cited — The defendant published a film showing the claimant involved in sex acts with prostitutes. Held: The appeal failed.
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Chester vs Afshar 2004
I would hold that justice requires that Miss Chester be afforded the remedy which she seeks, as the injury which she suffered at the hands of Mr Afshar was within the scope of the very risk which he should have warned her about when he was obtaining her consent to the operation which resulted in that injury. The injury was intimately involved with the duty to warn. Crucially, the Law Lords ruled that to succeed in a claim for negligence, the patient did not have to prove that they would have rejected the treatment that had been inadequately explained to them, only that they might have sought further advice or time to reflect further before making a decision. Cited — Explanation of Medical Risks essential The plaintiff alleged negligence in the failure by a surgeon to disclose or explain to her the risks inherent in the operation which he had advised. On the application of current desire autonomy, the claimant is being asked to express their immediate inclination about treatment in light of all the information they have. A doctor, the defendant, advised her to do a surgery. Had he done so, she would have sought second or even third opinions and would not have had the surgery when she did.
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Chester v Afshar [2004]: Case Analysis
In the second section, we critically examine the autonomy-based justification the majority in Chester gave for departing from those principles. However, she declined to bear the risks about which she questioned the surgeon and received no adequate response. Some information might confuse and other information might alarm the patient. That argument has even more force on the facts of this appeal, since in the Australian case Mrs Hart would have gone to another surgeon, the most experienced who could be found, whereas in this case no one has suggested that Mr Afshar was not a leading expert in this type of surgery. Her consultant, Mr Afshar, failed to warn of the risks of the surgery. Reverting to ideal desire autonomy does not resolve these conflicts as it may lead to a conflicting value being disregarded without explanation. Held: The claim failed.
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Chester v Afshar
Our expert legal team of leading Instruct Specialist Professional Negligence Solicitors We are a specialist The information published on this website is: a for reference purposes only; b does not create a contractual relationship; c does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as such; and d is not a complete or authoritative statement of the law. That injury would have been as liable to occur whenever the surgery was performed and whoever performed it. He later continues: In my opinion this argument is about as logical as saying that if one had been told, on entering a casino, that the odds on No 7 coming up at roulette were only 1 in 37, one would have gone away and come back next week or gone to a different casino. She has shown that but for the failure to warn she would not have consented to surgery on Monday 21 November 1994. Chappel v Hart mirrors the issues and arguments in the present case.
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