Why shouldn t the driving age be raised to 21. Glass 2022-10-08
Why shouldn t the driving age be raised to 21 Rating:
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Raising the driving age to 21 has been a topic of debate for many years, with proponents arguing that it could potentially reduce the number of accidents and fatalities on the road. However, there are several compelling reasons why the driving age should not be raised to 21.
First and foremost, raising the driving age to 21 would disproportionately impact young people and their ability to access education and employment opportunities. In many parts of the country, public transportation is limited or non-existent, making a driver's license a necessity for getting to school or work. For young people who live in rural areas or have disabilities that make public transportation difficult, a driver's license is even more essential. Restricting access to driving for an additional three years would severely limit the independence and autonomy of these individuals, and could have negative consequences on their ability to participate fully in society.
Additionally, raising the driving age to 21 would not necessarily lead to a decrease in accidents and fatalities. While it is true that younger drivers are more likely to be involved in car accidents, this is largely due to a lack of experience and judgment, rather than an inherent inability to handle a vehicle safely. By the age of 21, most individuals have had ample opportunity to gain experience and develop good driving habits, and are no more likely to be involved in accidents than older drivers.
Furthermore, raising the driving age to 21 could have unintended consequences on the economy. Many businesses rely on young people to fill entry-level positions, such as delivery drivers or sales associates, and a higher driving age could limit the pool of available employees. This could lead to increased costs for businesses, which could be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
In conclusion, while raising the driving age to 21 may seem like a solution to reduce accidents and fatalities on the road, it is not a viable option. It would disproportionately impact young people and their ability to access education and employment opportunities, and would not necessarily lead to a decrease in accidents and fatalities. It could also have negative consequences on the economy. Instead of raising the driving age, we should focus on other measures, such as increased driver education and stricter enforcement of traffic laws, to improve road safety for all ages.
Glass
Cleveland and Huertas 1985, pp. There was a belief that the separation would lead to a healthier financial system. Only 10 percent of a commercial bank's income could stem from securities. Many accounts of the Act identify the This source states that Senator Glass proposed many versions of his bill to Congress known as the Glass Bills in the two years prior to the Glass—Steagall Act being passed. Transcript of Clinton remarks at Financial Modernization bill signing, Washington, D. The final Glass—Steagall provisions contained in the 1933 Banking Act reduced from five years to one year the period in which commercial banks were required to eliminate such affiliations. In May 1933, Steagall's addition of allowing state-chartered banks to receive federal deposit insurance and shortening the time in which banks needed to eliminate securities affiliates to one year was known as the driving force of what helped the Glass—Steagall act to be signed into law.
Maureen 2010b , PDF , Congressional Research Service Report, no. Pendleton, "American Government and Politics: First Session of the Seventy-second Congress. Starting in 1987, the Federal Reserve Board interpreted this to mean a member bank could affiliate with a securities firm so long as that firm was not "engaged principally" in securities activities prohibited for a bank by Section 16. Nicolas January 2010 , "Bank Regulation and Financial Orthodoxy: the Lessons from the Glass—Steagall Act",. R41298 , retrieved February 10, 2012. The New York Times.
June 25, 1998 , Prepared Testimony of the Honorable Arthur Levitt, Jr. May 14, 1997 , Statement before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, United States House of Representatives, The Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives, archived from , retrieved February 25, 2012. Glass—Steagall also did not prevent securities firms from owning such institutions. What could we lose? Maureen 2010a , PDF , Congressional Research Service Report, no. In the 1960s, the Separately, starting in the 1980s, Congress debated bills to repeal Glass—Steagall's affiliation provisions Sections 20 and 32. Lockner and Hansche 2000, p. Some commentators have stated that the GLBA's repeal of the affiliation restrictions of the Glass—Steagall Act was an important cause of the Main article: Between 1930 and 1932, Senator Carter Glass D-VA introduced several versions of a bill known in each version as the Glass bill to regulate or prohibit the combination of commercial and investment banking and to establish other reforms except deposit insurance similar to the final provisions of the 1933 Banking Act.
One exception to this rule was that commercial banks could underwrite government-issued bonds. Economy's Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921-33? It worked pretty well for the industrial economy, which was highly organized, much more centralized and much more nationalized than the one in which we operate today. It provided litigators validation involving cases against such sub-prime investment instruments on behalf of their clients who were impacted by such injustices. May 1998 , PDF , Journal of Banking Law Forthcoming : 1—17 , retrieved February 13, 2012. The law gave banks one year after the law was passed on June 16, 1933 to decide whether they would be a commercial bank or an investment bank.
Starting in the early 1960s, federal banking regulators' interpretations of the Act permitted By that time, many commentators argued Glass—Steagall was already "dead". Senate PDF , retrieved October 16, 2014. While permitting affiliations between securities firms and companies other than Federal Reserve member banks, Glass—Steagall distinguished between what a Federal Reserve member bank could do directly and what an affiliate could do. . Nicholas 1998 , North Carolina Banking Institute, 2: 311—344 , retrieved February 14, 2012. Kelly III 1985, p. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks", University of Illinois Law Review, 2002 2 : 215—476,.
Parker 1935 , "The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation", Columbia Law Review, 35 5 : 697—724,. September 1999 , Community Investments, 11 2 : 1—3 , retrieved February 16, 2012. Although the magnitude may be questionable, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act can certainly be considered a factor in the global financial crisis revealed in 2008. Senate, June 17, 1998, Summaries of Prior Financial Modernization Legislation Considered and Passed by the Senate Banking Committee Since 1984 , retrieved February 24, 2012. At the time of the repeal, most commentators believed it would be harmless. Some believe that major U. But the world is very different.
With the exception of commercial banks being allowed to underwrite government-issued bonds, commercial banks could only have 10 percent of their income come from securities. Kelley published 1966 ,. Without formal and defensible protection as detailed in the Glass-Steagall Act, investment companies felt at liberty to move toward unscrupulous investment tactics that had occurred prior to 2009 involving sub-prime mortgages. The perception is that the Glass-Steagall Act created a sense of accountability among investors within the financial management industry, encouraging them to in effect shy away from ultra-risky transactions that could lead to financial meltdown. Department of the Treasury November 2003 , Report to the Congress on Financial Holding Companies under the Gramm—Leach—Bliley Act PDF , pp. Who Caused the Economic Crisis? Evidence From the Last Days of the Glass—Steagall Act PDF , ECB Working Paper Series, , retrieved February 25, 2012. Retrieved April 6, 2017.
Evidence From Israel's Bank Share Crisis and the Great Depression", Contemporary Economic Policy, 16 2 : 185—196,. Virgil; Fallon, Keiran J. Because the Federal Reserve's interpretations of the act had already weakened restrictions previously in place, commentators did not find much significance in the repeal, especially of sections 20 and 32. The previous Glass Bills before the final revision all had similar goals and brought up the same objectives, which were to separate commercial from investment banking, bring more banking activities under Federal Reserve supervision, and to allow branch banking. Thus a cultural shift was certainly in order after its repeal regardless of the loopholes that existed prior. Lockner and Hansche 2000, p.
It also includes how the deposit insurance provisions of the bill were very controversial at the time, which almost led to the rejection of the bill once again. A Critique of Free Market Approaches, New Directions in Modern Economics, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 978-1-85898-638-8. A Preliminary Assessment", Current Development in Monetary and Financial Law, vol. Whereas a Federal Reserve member bank could not buy, sell, underwrite, or deal in any security except as specifically permitted by Section 16, such a bank could affiliate with a company so long as that company was not "engaged principally" in such activities. Burns 1974, p 78. February 25, 1997 , Statement before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, United States House of Representatives, The Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives, archived from , retrieved February 25, 2012.
