Aesthetic judgement. 8.2 Aesthetic Experience and Judgement 2022-10-27
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Aesthetic judgement is the process of evaluating the beauty or artistic value of a work of art or other aesthetic object. It is a highly subjective process, as different people may have different preferences and standards when it comes to what they consider to be beautiful or aesthetically pleasing.
One of the key components of aesthetic judgement is the ability to appreciate the formal qualities of a work of art, such as its composition, form, and use of color, line, and texture. Aestheticians, or those who study aesthetics, have traditionally focused on these formal qualities as a way of understanding how an artwork is able to evoke an emotional response in the viewer.
However, aesthetic judgement is not simply about evaluating the formal qualities of a work of art. It also involves considering the cultural, historical, and personal contexts in which the work was created. For example, a painting that was created in the early 20th century may be evaluated differently by someone who is familiar with the artistic movements and cultural milieu of that time period compared to someone who is not.
In addition to considering the formal qualities and context of a work of art, aesthetic judgement also involves the use of critical thinking and analysis. This means carefully considering the arguments and evidence that support a particular aesthetic judgement, and being open to the possibility that one's own aesthetic preferences may change over time.
Overall, aesthetic judgement is a complex and multifaceted process that involves the ability to appreciate the formal qualities of a work of art, consider its cultural and historical context, and use critical thinking and analysis. It is a crucial aspect of the human experience, as it allows us to engage with the world around us in a meaningful and enriching way.
Kant's Theory of Taste, A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment
If so, there is a sense in which aesthetic properties are mind-dependent, since appearances are appearances to some observer. A Humean sentimentalist will probably say that normativity is something we somehow construct or foist upon our pleasures and displeasures, which have no such content. Others dispute this Zangwill 1999. Since judgments of taste are based on responses of pleasure, it would make little sense if our judgments were more or less appropriate but our responses were not. Relativists do not practice what they preach.
Aesthetic Judgment > Notes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
For this reader, these questions seemed unnecessary, especially given the clarity of her commentary. A more holistic picture of the relation between response and judgment preserves the spirit of the subjectivist doctrine while fitting our actual lives more accurately. Ted Cohen 2005 Objectivity , Objectivity Objectivity in the sciences, especially the social sciences, is paired implicitly or explicitly with its opposite, subjectivity. For example, most of us think that our judgments have improved since we were younger. According to the theory defended here, aesthetic judgements may be unreasoned, insofar as they are immediate judgements made on the basis of, and acquiring their justification from, causally prior sensory states. The idea seems to be that judgments of sublimity are grounded on both pleasure and pain, whereas judgments of beauty are grounded only on pleasure.
The present strategy is to use this Kantian account in order to ground a wider category of the aesthetic, which includes judgments of taste along with judgments of daintiness, dumpiness, delicacy, elegance, and the rest. Judgments of taste are like empirical judgments in that they have universal validity, but they are unlike empirical judgment in that they are made on the basis of an inner subjective response. Complete the Unit Test by the date on the Schedule of Work. An early formulation is Edward Bullough's 1957 , although his interests were somewhat more psychological than philosophical. This is less true now. However, it is not clear that there is reason to restrict beauty in this way.
Influential series of anti-formalist arguments. Book 3, sections 1—6. That good form follows from good functionality became a 20th-century principle for industrial design and modernist architecture. Hume tried to solve it one way, which has flaws that you want to consider. These are very hard questions. However, judgments about the niceness of Canary-wine do not aspire to a normative conception of truth.
Such formal elements of an object as shape, arrangement, and lines, he argued, contribute in an important way to aesthetic judgements. This may be inevitable. What she then adds in order to explain this are various normative characteristics, such as the aspiration to correctness 1984: 157—170. She shows deftly how Kant indicates not only the epistemological, but also especially the moral and political implications of his argument. It is not clear who is right here. This is because the beauty depends on or is determined by that specific pattern.
They ought to share it on pain of making a judgment which is incorrect or inappropriate. However, although we can cast aesthetic normativity in terms of truth, we need not do so. . Supplemental resources bottom of page provide additional perspectives on aesthetic experience. Responses only license judgments which can be more or less appropriate because responses themselves can be more or less appropriate.
The following is a survey of a number of other candidate features of aesthetic judgments: truth, mind-independence, nonaesthetic dependence, and lawlessness. Somewhat curiously, perhaps, some philosophers have thought that even though such judgments are subjective, they are still capable of being supported. According to Allison, the quid facti addresses the conditions under which a judgment of taste can be pure, while the quid juris deals with the legitimacy of the claim to universality, that is, whether a judgment of taste that fulfills the conditions of purity rightfully demands the agreement of others. Someone might even think that colors are bare properties of things. Aesthetic ideas are crucial for the Dialectic and for beauty as a symbol of the morally good. We may even think that there is no right answer to be had if we are asked to compare two very different things. To see how this works, consider representational properties.
One view is that aesthetic properties depend on the appearances of things—the way things look or sound, for example see Mitrović 2013, 2018. On the other hand, this aspect of the British sentimentalist view is a weakness in their general outlook since they have no place for a faculty of practical reason, and that means that they lack any intelligible conception of human action Korsgaard 1996, 2009. When the question of design is raised, it becomes increasingly difficult to suppose that an aesthetic judgment about an object is entirely divorced from other considerations —an issue that is perhaps most acute in the case of architecture. It is probably best to take aesthetic judgments as central. Furthermore, we can think of that pattern without thinking of it as beautiful.
Reasoned and Unreasoned Judgement: On Inference, Acquaintance and Aesthetic Normativity
People who think in a certain way may be defective in self-knowledge, just as those who take part in social rituals may not be able to describe those rituals see Zangwill forthcoming for critical discussion. An early exponent of this idea was In the early twentieth century, the idea of an aesthetic attitude was developed further, given this particular name, and given more detailed treatment, though it eventually became a problematic notion. Perhaps there are rarefied beauties that only elite special souls can appreciate. As with moral relativism, one can almost always catch the professed relativist about judgments of beauty making and acting on non-relative judgments of beauty—for example, in their judgments about music, nature and everyday household objects. But it is not part of what it is to be that pattern that it is beautiful. However, if we are describing our thought as it is, not how it ought to be, then there is no getting away from the fact that normativity is a necessary condition of judgments of taste or beauty.